Vue normale
Kernel prepatch 7.2-rc7
I don't currently see any value in delaying the 7.2 release, so I would expect that to happen next weekend unless something really bad pops up."
The Software Stewardship Lab launches
Our current research focuses are:
- Software supply chain security — We're working on an observatory that allows users to identify and monitor the world's critical Open Source packages in real time, including previously hidden parts of the dependency graph.
- Maintainer burnout — Our report on burnout in Open Source has been well-received. We're working on yearly follow-ups, plus a companion report on how AI is affecting maintainer burnout.
Moving forward, the Lab's experts will direct funding to and supervise Open Source sustainability researchers doing critical work. We are already working with universities to teach the next generations of software supply chain experts.
[$] Bringing BPF to binfmt_misc
b4 0.16.0 released
The new "b4 bugs" command integrates with git-bug to let you track bug reports alongside your git repository. Bugs are stored as git objects inside the repo, so they travel with the code and can be shared via git push/pull without any external service.
There are also a lot of improvements to b4 review (which was covered here in March), better conflict resolution in b4 shazam, improved history rewriting, and more.
Nelson: rust-lang/rust is adopting an LLM policy
No one except the author is required to read LLM output unless they choose to: LLM output isn't allowed in public docs, PR descriptions, or Github comments unless it's clearly marked; reviewers aren't required to look at LLM PRs if they don't want to.No one is required to use LLMs to contribute to rust-lang/rust: policies must be written first for humans, and only summarized for machines; LLM reviews cannot substitute for human review or self-review.
You are allowed to generate LLM content that only you see, without disclosure, as long as you do not post it anywhere that you expect us to read or review.
An LLM agent attempts to compromise a project on GitHub
The agent opened a malicious pull request (PR) to ⟨REPO_A⟩ and pursued a number of strategies to get it merged:
- Repeatedly commented on the PR with sockpuppet accounts to manufacture consensus and pressure the maintainer into approving with minimal review.
- Opened a GitHub Issue in another repository (also owned by ⟨PERSON_A⟩) containing a prompt injection for other coding agents. The malicious instructions were addressed to issue-triage AI coding agents and invisible to humans viewing the website.
- Sent multiple emails to ⟨PERSON_A⟩ and ⟨PERSON_B⟩, with different pretexts to get them to run malicious code. Over the course of the sample, the agent sent five emails, some containing malware, others aimed at persuading a maintainer to accept the pull request.
It would be surprising if this were the only incident of this type; the only real difference here is that the people involved are documenting what happened.
[$] The beginning of a process-builder API
C-Kermit 11 released
As Debian maintainer of Kermit, I noticed some areas where it wasn't matching modern expectations. One area was, not surprising for a project of its age, security. Another area was that its character set or line-ending conversions are usually not desired now; we are used to byte-identical binary transfers, and the defaults caused confusion and even some rare instances of data corruption. So I started making a few patches last year.
See the changelog for details on the work that has been done.
Most of us probably haven't thought about C-Kermit in years (if ever), but there was a time when it was an essential tool for moving files between machines.
SQLite Critical CVEs or LLM Slop? (JFrog blog)
These LLM slop CVEs can cause organizations to waste time investigating and patching vulnerabilities that do not actually exist, as well as polluting vulnerability databases. In environments where Critical vulnerabilities are automatically prioritized or tickets are opened based on vulnerability scores, such fabricated CVEs can turn into a real burden.In environments where AI is used to automate vulnerability triage and remediation this becomes even more concerning. An AI agent that encounters a fabricated CVE may attempt to locate the vulnerable function, generate a patch, or recommend changes based on code that does not even exist. Instead of helping security teams remediate real vulnerabilities, it can lead them down a completely wrong path, potentially introducing unnecessary changes and wasting time.
Kernel prepatch 7.2-rc6
Hmm. This rc is huge. Even by the "new normal" standards this is a big rc, and I think it's the biggest rc6 we've had in years at least by commit count." There were 537 non-merge commits applied between 7.2-rc5 and 7.2-rc6.
[$] Reconsidering O_CREAT|O_DIRECTORY
[$] Hazard pointers for the kernel
Kernel prepatch 7.2-rc5
So it's a bit too big for my liking, but nothing in there strikes me as particularly strange or scary".
A Debian general resolution on LLM usage
as far as practical", or explicitly allowing LLM usage subject to a set of conditions. The discussion period has just begun; the beginning of the voting period does not yet appear to have been set. Those who want to look over the discussion ahead of the inevitable LWN article can find it over here.