The open-source world has been struggling for a few years now to understand how to approach large language models (LLMs) and the licensing applied to them. What constitutes "freedom" with respect to a black box filled with numerical weights? The process taken by the Open Source Initiative (OSI) in the development of its Open Source AI Definition was controversial at best, as was its output. Now, the Linux Foundation's Mike Dolan has brought a new license to the OSI for approval. It is called the OpenMDW ("Open Model, Data, and Weights"), and it aims to clarify licensing for the distribution of LLMs and related materials, but consensus is proving hard to find for this license as well.

The Rust blog reports on a malicious crate, called proc-macro1, that was uploaded to the crates.io repository.

Furthermore, we discovered that the popular arrayref crate had recently been republished and made to depend on this crate, with the most recent versions yanked. We have removed the malicious version and unyanked the maliciously-yanked versions. Other crates by that author (internment, append-only-vec) were also affected so we have done the same for those, and locked the account as a precaution. We do not believe the author of arrayref to be acting maliciously, but their computer or credentials are likely compromised, and we are attempting to contact them.

As of this writing, 2,346 non-merge changesets have been pulled into the mainline repository for the 7.3 kernel release. That, clearly, is a mere down payment on the flood that is to come. Even so, those early pulls brought in some noteworthy changes, including (but not limited to) a significant reworking of how group scheduling works on multiprocessor systems.

Version 154.0 of the Firefox browser has been released. Changes include extending local network access protections to WebSocket connections, more flexible, per-site configuration of cookie and data clearing, and more.

Linus Torvalds released the 7.2 kernel on August 17, after noting that the number of fixes coming in was still "bigger than I would have wished for". In fact, 7.2 was one of the busiest development cycles in the kernel's history, adding nearly 600,000 lines of code. It's time to look at some statistics to get a handle on how the kernel's development community is changing.

The 7.2 kernel has been released. Linus said:

Well, this last week of the release was - once again - bigger than I would have wished for, but hey, with the whole "new normal" thing, if I delayed releases for that reason we'd probably never have a release at all.

Significant features in this release include common attributes support in the bpf() system call, cache-aware load balancing for the CPU scheduler, large-folio support in the Btrfs filesystem, further swap subsystem improvements, improvements to the Landlock security module, support for block devices with inline encryption hardware via the dm-inlinecrypt device-mapper target, and much more. See the LWN merge window summaries (part 1, part 2) and the KernelNewbies 7.2 page for more information.

The size of a processor's page-table entries directly limits how much physical memory that processor is able to access. Back in the 32-bit days, that limit was 4GB, an amount of memory that once seemed nearly infinite, but which would now struggle to hold a basic AI-enabled "hello world" app. The expansion to 64 bits on most popular architectures would seem to have removed those limits now; some Arm systems, for example, can use 56 of those bits to access up to 72PB of memory. So it might be surprising that the Arm architecture is evolving to support even larger page-table entries (PTEs). This patch set from Anshuman Khandual adds support for 128-bit PTEs, but who will benefit from this capability is not entirely clear.

Virtualization places a guest system into a separate security domain, typically with fewer privileges than software running directly on the host. Increasingly, there is interest in creating multiple security domains within a single virtualized system as well. CPU vendors (and software vendors too) are implementing solutions; each of which, of course, is different from all of the others. KVM planes, currently under development by Jörg Rödel, Paolo Bonzini, and others in the KVM community, is an attempt to provide an abstraction layer that makes all of these features available on Linux systems; it is not a small task.

The 7.2-rc7 kernel prepatch is out for testing. It is still bigger than Linus would like, but he said nonetheless: "I don't currently see any value in delaying the 7.2 release, so I would expect that to happen next weekend unless something really bad pops up."

The 7.1.8, 6.18.44, 6.12.103, and 6.6.151 stable kernels have been released; each contains a fair number of important fixes.

The Software Stewardship Lab, a nonprofit organization based in Scotland, has announced its existence.

Our current research focuses are:

• Software supply chain security — We're working on an observatory that allows users to identify and monitor the world's critical Open Source packages in real time, including previously hidden parts of the dependency graph.
• Maintainer burnout — Our report on burnout in Open Source has been well-received. We're working on yearly follow-ups, plus a companion report on how AI is affecting maintainer burnout.

Moving forward, the Lab's experts will direct funding to and supervise Open Source sustainability researchers doing critical work. We are already working with universities to teach the next generations of software supply chain experts.

The kernel is able to run a few types of executable files, including native binaries in the ELF format and interpreted programs that begin with the #! marker. It also, however, has a mechanism, called binfmt_misc, that can be configured from user space to enable the transparent execution of programs in just about any format. This feature has been relatively static for years, but it seems likely to receive some significant updates in the near future, including the ability to load BPF programs that can decide how to run a given program.

Konstantin Ryabitsev has announced the release of version 0.16.0 of the b4 software-development tool. The biggest change is the addition of bug-tracking support:

The new "b4 bugs" command integrates with git-bug to let you track bug reports alongside your git repository. Bugs are stored as git objects inside the repo, so they travel with the code and can be shared via git push/pull without any external service.

There are also a lot of improvements to b4 review (which was covered here in March), better conflict resolution in b4 shazam, improved history rewriting, and more.

Jynn Nelson describes the Rust language team's new LLM policy on the Inside Rust blog.

No one except the author is required to read LLM output unless they choose to: LLM output isn't allowed in public docs, PR descriptions, or Github comments unless it's clearly marked; reviewers aren't required to look at LLM PRs if they don't want to.

No one is required to use LLMs to contribute to rust-lang/rust: policies must be written first for humans, and only summarized for machines; LLM reviews cannot substitute for human review or self-review.

You are allowed to generate LLM content that only you see, without disclosure, as long as you do not post it anywhere that you expect us to read or review.

The AI Security Institute has released a detailed report on an security incident of its own making. The Institute set some LLM agents loose on the Internet with a security challenge; soon they were creating malware-laden pull requests and sock-puppet accounts to promote them.

The agent opened a malicious pull request (PR) to ⟨REPO_A⟩ and pursued a number of strategies to get it merged:

1. Repeatedly commented on the PR with sockpuppet accounts to manufacture consensus and pressure the maintainer into approving with minimal review.
2. Opened a GitHub Issue in another repository (also owned by ⟨PERSON_A⟩) containing a prompt injection for other coding agents. The malicious instructions were addressed to issue-triage AI coding agents and invisible to humans viewing the website.
3. Sent multiple emails to ⟨PERSON_A⟩ and ⟨PERSON_B⟩, with different pretexts to get them to run malicious code. Over the course of the sample, the agent sent five emails, some containing malware, others aimed at persuading a maintainer to accept the pull request.

It would be surprising if this were the only incident of this type; the only real difference here is that the people involved are documenting what happened.

The recent discussion on "spawn templates" raised questions about whether it was time to provide an alternative to the classic Unix fork()/exec() pattern for process creation. One idea that was raised there was to shift the template pattern into an interface that could be used to efficiently assemble new processes from bare cloth, without duplicating the parent process. Preferably, that interface would be able to implement posix_spawn(). Li Chen, the author of the spawn-template work, has now responded with a patch series (written with significant LLM assistance) showing what a process-builder API for Linux might look like.

For those of us with a long memory: John Goerzen has announced the release of C-Kermit 11, the first release of this file-transfer utility in 15 years.

As Debian maintainer of Kermit, I noticed some areas where it wasn't matching modern expectations. One area was, not surprising for a project of its age, security. Another area was that its character set or line-ending conversions are usually not desired now; we are used to byte-identical binary transfers, and the defaults caused confusion and even some rare instances of data corruption. So I started making a few patches last year.

See the changelog for details on the work that has been done.

Most of us probably haven't thought about C-Kermit in years (if ever), but there was a time when it was an essential tool for moving files between machines.

The JFrog blog examines some reported vulnerabilities in SQLite, some of which made their way into high-profile vulnerability databases, that turned out to be entirely fabricated by LLMs.

These LLM slop CVEs can cause organizations to waste time investigating and patching vulnerabilities that do not actually exist, as well as polluting vulnerability databases. In environments where Critical vulnerabilities are automatically prioritized or tickets are opened based on vulnerability scores, such fabricated CVEs can turn into a real burden.

In environments where AI is used to automate vulnerability triage and remediation this becomes even more concerning. An AI agent that encounters a fabricated CVE may attempt to locate the vulnerable function, generate a patch, or recommend changes based on code that does not even exist. Instead of helping security teams remediate real vulnerabilities, it can lead them down a completely wrong path, potentially introducing unnecessary changes and wasting time.

The 7.2-rc6 kernel prepatch is out for testing. Quoth Linus: "Hmm. This rc is huge. Even by the "new normal" standards this is a big rc, and I think it's the biggest rc6 we've had in years at least by commit count." There were 537 non-merge commits applied between 7.2-rc5 and 7.2-rc6.

Linux provides a system call (mkdir()) to create a directory, and a few variants of open() that can open a directory. There is, however, no system call in Linux that can create and open a directory in a single, race-free call. Jori Koolstra has been working on remedying that situation, most recently by repurposing a set of open() flags that currently return an error. There are, however, concerns that show just how hard it can be to create user-space interfaces that do not present traps for application developers.