William Woodruff, better known online as "yossarian", has published a blog post to make the case that users should not place their trust in trusted publishing:

Trusted Publishing is a mechanism for establishing trust between an external machine identity (like a CI/CD workflow) and one or more projects on a package index/registry. The "trust" in "Trusted Publishing" refers to that trust relationship, and not to anything else.

It is not, and cannot be, a signal for package trust or quality. You cannot use it to determine whether a package is safe or "good," and PyPI consciously stymies attempts to misuse it for that purpose by not rendering it as a "green checkmark" or anything else of the sort.

Or as another framing: Trusted Publishing is just a form of authentication. It doesn't tell you anything other than that an upload was authenticated, which all uploads to PyPI are.

LWN covered trusted publishing in June.

Security updates have been issued by AlmaLinux (nodejs22 and nodejs24), Fedora (clamav, hplip, kernel, kernel-headers, librabbitmq, mingw-expat, mir, perl-Imager, podman-tui, prometheus-podman-exporter, python-rpds-py, rust-ashpd, rust-busd, rust-gtk4-macros, rust-inferno, rust-quick-xml, rust-reqsign-aws-v4, rust-wayland-scanner, and sandogasa), Oracle (container-tools:rhel8, kernel, mariadb:10.11, mariadb:11.8, nginx, perl:5.32, php, php:7.4, rrdtool, ruby:2.5, ruby:3.3, ruby:4.0, and uek-kernel), Red Hat (kernel, opentelemetry-collector, and python-urllib3), Slackware (c-ares and openssh), SUSE (bind, chromedriver, cryptsetup, s390-tools, dnsmasq, jackson-annotations, jackson-core, jackson-databind, lcms2, pacemaker, perl-Cpanel-JSON-XS, perl-Crypt-SaltedHash, postfix, and python-mistune), and Ubuntu (gnutls28, gzip, openssh, php7.0, python-parsl, python3.10, python3.12, python3.14, request-tracker5, socat, sogo, and tar).